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The human brain continuously generates predictions about the environment based on
learned regularities in the world. These predictions actively and efficiently facilitate the
interpretation of incoming sensory information. We review evidence that, as a result of
this facilitation, predictions directly influence conscious experience. Specifically, we pro-
pose that predictions enable rapid generation of conscious percepts and bias the contents
of awareness in situations of uncertainty. The possible neural mechanisms underlying this
facilitation are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Perception has evolved to transform raw sensory signals into infor-
mation that can guide behavior. But perception is not a purely
stimulus-driven phenomenon; the brain perceives the world
proactively. Endogenous influences, such as attention, memory,
and mood, guide perception to ensure that informative represen-
tations of the environment are generated as efficiently as possible.
In this review, we focus on the influence of predictions on
visual perception. The predictions we discuss are not analogous to
the deliberate, elaborative foresight that individuals may engage
in when planning for the future (e.g., thinking about which route
home from work will have the least traffic). Instead,we use the term
“prediction” here to refer to expectations about the immediate
sensory environment based on previous experience and learn-
ing. Through everyday experience, individuals learn many types
of regularities in the world, such as associations among items or
events. For example, a yellow traffic light is almost always followed
by a red light. Insofar as the environment is generally regular, it
is, to an extent, predictable. Expectations about the environment
can be derived from these learned regularities and used to guide
sensory processing, presumably via top-down (descending) pro-
jections linking brain regions involved in generating expectations
with lower-level sensory regions.
If predictions guide processing in visual areas, it follows that
this facilitation may have consequences for conscious perception1.
We argue that predictive mechanisms may shape the contents of
visual awareness during instances of sensory ambiguity, allow-
ing subjective experience of the world to remain informative
and coherent. Additionally, when sensory input is less ambigu-
ous, predictions may allow percepts to be generated more quickly
1We use “subjective visual experience,” “conscious perception,” and “visual aware-
ness” interchangeably to refer to the phenomenological experience of seeing, distinct
from other forms of consciousness such as self-awareness.
and with less interference by sensory noise. In other words, the
expectation elicited by a yellow traffic light may cause a driver
to consciously perceive the subsequent red light more quickly
than otherwise possible. We conclude by discussing the neural
mechanisms underlying these predictive influences.
PREDICTIONS INFLUENCE CONSCIOUS PERCEPTION
PREDICTIONS GUIDE THE INTERPRETATION OF AMBIGUOUS STIMULI
One method for studying the influence of predictions on aware-
ness is to show observers stimuli with multiple perceptual inter-
pretations and determine if predictions affect what they see. The
popular perceptual phenomenon known as binocular rivalry pro-
vides a convenient means to accomplish this. Binocular rivalry
occurs when a unique image is presented to each eye; interpreta-
tion of the stimuli is inherently ambiguous because the two eyes
provide conflicting information about the shared portion of the
visual field. The brain must work out the most likely interpreta-
tion of this impossible input (Hohwy et al., 2008). The resolution
of this problem is striking: the two stimuli do not fuse together
into a blended percept, but rather alternately dominate perception
(for reviews of binocular rivalry and multistable perception more
generally, see Leopold and Logothetis, 1999; Blake and Logothetis,
2002; Sterzer et al., 2009).
Binocular rivalry is sensitive to many factors, including low-
level stimulus properties (e.g., Kaplan and Metlay, 1964; Fahle,
1982) and higher-order endogenous influences such as attention,
imagery, and affect (e.g., Ooi and He, 1999; Pearson et al., 2008;
Anderson et al., 2011), so a single process or mechanism should
not be credited as the “source” of rivalry (Blake and Logothetis,
2002). However, recent findings suggest that predictions play a
role in resolving the ambiguity inherent in this phenomenon. For
example, a stimulus will tend to dominate rivalry if it has been
presented more frequently than the competing stimulus in the
recent past; the likelihood of each stimulus is estimated based on
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recent experience, generating expectations that can guide percep-
tion (Chopin and Mamassian, 2012). The tendency of stimuli to
change position smoothly during motion can also provide pre-
dictive cues for perception. Thus, observers who view a stream
of images depicting a rotating grating are more likely to perceive
the stimulus consistent with the rotation trajectory at the onset
of rivalry (Figure 1A; Denison et al., 2011). Verbal stimuli can
also produce an expectation for semantically related stimuli. To
demonstrate this, Costello et al. (2009) used a variant of binocular
rivalry, termed continuous flash suppression, which relies on the
tendency of high-contrast dynamic noise to dominate awareness
when presented in rivalry with another stimulus (Tsuchiya and
Koch, 2005). Costello et al. found that a word presented to one eye
breaks suppression by high frequency noise presented to the other
eye more quickly when a semantically related prime is displayed
prior to rivalry (Figure 1B).
In addition to binocular rivalry, bistable figures reveal the abil-
ity of top-down predictions to influence conscious perception.
FIGURE 1 | Predictions affect the outcome of binocular rivalry. (A)
When a stream of images depicting a grating rotating in 45˚ increments is
presented to both eyes, observers are more likely to perceive the grating
consistent with this pattern (the “matching eye” stimulus) at the onset of
rivalry. Adapted, under creative commons license, from Denison et al.
(2011). (B) A word prime (“salt”) causes a semantically related target word
(“pepper”; left eye) to break suppression by dynamic noise (right eye)
during rivalry more quickly than when the prime and target are not related.
The increasing contrast of the target over time helps ensure that the target
eventually breaks suppression. Adapted, with permission, from Costello
et al. (2009).
Bistable figures have two mutually exclusive interpretations that
alternately dominate awareness during viewing. However, a pre-
dictive cue related to one of the interpretations of a bistable figure
can bias perception in favor of that interpretation (Figure 2A;
Bugelski and Alampay, 1961; Balcetis and Dale, 2007; Goolkasian
and Woodberry, 2010). Stimuli can also display bistable motion;
an array of moving dot stimuli can be arranged so that observers
perceive a rotating cylinder with spontaneous reversals in rota-
tion direction. However, when observers are led to expect that
the cylinder will consistently rotate in a particular direction, this
interpretation dominates perception (Sterzer et al., 2008).
Intriguingly, predictions can alter the perception of stimuli that
are normally perceptually stable. For example, most individuals
see the left disk in Figure 2B as a convex and the right disk as
concave. However, the contour of each disk is actually ambigu-
ous: this subjective interpretation is driven by the shading of the
figures and the learned assumption that “light comes from above”
(Brewster, 1826; Sun and Perona, 1998; Adams et al., 2004). New
experience contradicting this assumption can cause a substantial
FIGURE 2 | Predictions affect the interpretation of ambiguous stimuli.
(A) Example of an ambiguous figure with its two possible perceptual
interpretations emphasized (left). Viewing a prime related to one of the
interpretations (right) biases perception in favor of that interpretation.
Adapted, with permission, from Goolkasian and Woodberry (2010).
Copyright ©by Springer Publishing. (B) These two disks appear to be
concave and convex, respectively, due to learned assumption that light
comes from above. Experience violating this assumption causes a new
shading scheme to maximally evoke the illusion of contour. Adapted from
Adams et al. (2004). Copyright ©by Nature Publishing Group.
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shift in inferred light position; as a result, a new shading scheme
will maximally evoke the illusion of contour (Adams et al., 2004).
Similarly, individuals learn over time that fast-moving objects are
less common than slow moving and stationary objects, producing
an expectation that can guide perception. New visual experience
dominated by fast-moving stimuli alters this expectation, and by
extension, subsequent motion perception (Stocker and Simoncelli,
2006; Sotiropoulos et al., 2011). Together, these studies demon-
strate that predictions derived from experience can affect how
observers see the world.
PREDICTIONS FACILITATE PERCEPTION DURING OBJECT RECOGNITION
Even when visual input is not ambiguous, predictive mechanisms
may influence conscious perception. We hypothesize that predic-
tions allow conscious percepts to be generated more efficiently
and with less inhibition by sensory noise2. The most direct evi-
dence for this claim is provided by studies showing that predictions
can facilitate perception of objects when visual input is noisy.
Observers viewing fragmented object figures are more likely to
perceive the objects when they are informed about their cate-
gory (e.g., “an animal” for an elephant; Reynolds, 1985). Similarly,
observers instructed to indicate their subjective visual experience
report successfully perceiving expected stimuli at greater levels
of degradation or lower contrast than unexpected stimuli (Eger
et al., 2007; Esterman and Yantis, 2010; Melloni et al., 2011). In the
latter study, electrophysiological activity evoked by expected stim-
uli correlated with subjective experience earlier than that evoked
by unexpected stimuli, suggesting that predictions reduced the
latency of neural activity related to conscious perception (Melloni
et al., 2011).
A large body of research demonstrates that predictions make
object recognition faster and more accurate. These studies provide
additional, although indirect, evidence for predictive facilitation of
conscious perception. These results must be interpreted with cau-
tion for two reasons. First, object recognition is a multifaceted
process, with multiple stages that may be amenable to influence by
predictive mechanisms (e.g., the assignment of semantic attributes
to the perceived object). Second, most of the studies cited below
examined the influence of predictions on behavioral proxies of
recognition such as reaction time rather than subjective reports
of perception. However, it will be worthwhile for future research
to determine if predictive facilitation of object recognition is due,
at least in part, to faster and more accurate generation of object
percepts.
For instance, contextual facilitation of object recognition arises
from the knowledge that certain objects often reliably co-occur
in particular settings. Cubicles and copy machines, but not octo-
puses and cars, are found inside office buildings. Furthermore,
objects within a context are often arranged in a regular manner:
computer monitors rest on desks inside of cubicles. Over time,
observers learn many sets of such regularities, termed schemata or
2When interpreting the influence of predictions on perception, it is important
to consider potential contributions of attention because the two may be easily
confounded. However, attention and prediction are dissociable in several ways
(Hohwy, 2012; Summerfield and Egner, 2009) and efforts have begun to elucidate
the independent contributions of each to perception (Wyart et al., 2012).
“context frames” (Friedman, 1979). Cues within a scene can acti-
vate associated context frames, allowing observers to predict other
features of the environment (Bar, 2004). Accordingly, observers
identify objects faster and more accurately when they are shown
in their typical environment (e.g., a toaster in the kitchen, Bie-
derman, 1972; Palmer, 1975; Biederman et al., 1982; Davenport
and Potter, 2004) or are preceded by an object drawn from the
same context (e.g., a bedroom dresser and a vanity mirror, Gronau
et al., 2008; see also Sachs et al., 2011). Conversely, recognition is
impaired when the expected spatial relationships among objects
in a scene are disrupted (Biederman, 1972).
Associations among stimuli can be reinforced over a lifetime
of experience. However, they can also be generated quite quickly
under artificial conditions in the laboratory (e.g., Chun and Jiang,
1998, 1999; Aminoff et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2009; den Ouden et al.,
2010; Turk-Browne et al., 2010). Thus, associative learning appears
to be quite flexible and continuously updated. For instance, in a
study of perceptual prediction (den Ouden et al., 2010), observers
were asked to judge whether a degraded image depicted a face
or a house. An auditory cue presented at the start of each trial
signaled which stimulus type was more likely to appear, and the
experimenters manipulated the predictive strength of these cues
over time. Modeling of the behavioral data demonstrated that
observers updated their estimates of stimulus category likelihood
on a trial-by-trial basis and responded more quickly when cues
were highly predictive.
Apart from learned associations among stimuli, preliminary
processing of visual information can also create expectancies that
facilitate perception. Visual stimuli contain information distrib-
uted across a range of spatial frequencies (Figure 3A). Low spatial
frequency (LSF) information is rapidly extracted from incoming
sensory input and encodes gross properties such as the global shape
of the environment and its constituent objects (Figure 3B). In con-
trast, high spatial frequency (HSF) information is processed more
slowly and corresponds to edges and fine details (Figure 3C; Shap-
ley, 1990; Schyns and Oliva, 1994; Bar et al., 2006). It is possible
that LSF information can elicit predictions (Bar, 2003) because
objects in the same basic-level category often display a similar
global shape (Rosch et al., 1976). For example, individual dogs
vary tremendously, but all dogs share roughly the same gross fea-
tures (e.g., four legs and a tail), which immediately differentiate
them from members of many other basic-level categories. With
experience, we come to learn the defining features of many kinds
of objects. Thus, while LSF information lacks fine detail, it is suf-
ficient to trigger general category information stored in memory
that guides interpretation of the stimulus (Bar, 2003; Bar et al.,
2006; Oliva and Torralba, 2007). In addition to individual objects,
different exemplars of basic-level scenes (such as a city street) also
share global features that can constrain and facilitate recognition
(Bar, 2004; Oliva and Torralba, 2007). Thus, rapid processing of
LSF information may explain the remarkable ability of observers
to extract the “gist” of a scene at a glance (Biederman et al., 1974;
Thorpe et al., 1996; Oliva and Torralba, 2007).
To summarize, predictions may shape the contents of awareness
when visual input is ambiguous and enable faster and more sen-
sitive conscious perception under less strenuous circumstances.
The ability of predictions to shape perception under conditions
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FIGURE 3 | An image filtered to include (A) both low and high spatial frequency information (B) predominantly low spatial frequencies
(C) predominantly high spatial frequencies. The low spatial frequency information in (B) is not sufficient to identify the polar bear but nevertheless
substantially constrains the possible interpretations of the stimulus.
of uncertainty is clearly advantageous; it is better to generate a
meaningful interpretation of the world, informed by previous
experience, than to faithfully represent a noisy sensory signal.
When visual input is more informative, predictions still guide
sensory processing to make conscious perception as efficient as
possible. Note that although we suggest that predictions influence
conscious experience, predictions themselves may be learned and
applied without awareness (e.g., Chun and Jiang, 1998, 1999; Kim
et al., 2009; Turk-Browne et al., 2010). We next consider how, at
the neural level, predictions may guide perception.
THE NEURAL BASIS OF PREDICTION
DESCENDING CORTICO–CORTICO PROJECTIONS ALLOW PREDICTIONS
TO GUIDE SENSORY PROCESSING
An increasingly popular framework (e.g., Mumford, 1992; Rao
and Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2005; Friston and Kiebel, 2009), termed
“predictive coding”, posits that top-down predictions facilitate per-
ception by reducing the need to reconstruct the environment via
exhaustive bottom-up analysis of incoming sensory information.
Validated predictions efficiently explain away some of the sensory
input, conserving resources for analysis of unpredicted compo-
nents. The hierarchical organization of sensory cortex suggests
a natural computational architecture for the integration of top-
down predictions and bottom-up sensory information. Ascending
projections in sensory cortex are sparse and focused, terminating
in predominately layer 4 of cortical targets, whereas descending
connections project to a larger number of region and innervate
their targets in superficial and deep layers of cortex (Felleman
and Van Essen, 1991; Friston, 2009). Predictive coding proposes
that descending projections convey predictions about the content
or organization of the sensory input. Ascending projections con-
vey any information incongruent with the predictions (i.e., an
“error term”) received from higher sensory areas. Thus, recipro-
cally connected cortical areas are able to engage in a dynamic
process in which predictions are modified based on incoming
sensory input until the higher-level region is able to arrive at
reasonable approximation of the incoming input (Ullman, 1995;
Friston, 2005).
This predictive coding framework has traditionally been pre-
sented with the hierarchical organization of sensory cortex in mind
(e.g., Mumford, 1992; Friston, 2005). However, the existence of
reciprocal connections between prefrontal and visual cortices in
the macaque (Webster et al., 1994; Cavada et al., 2000) and evi-
dence of functional interaction between prefrontal and inferior
temporal regions in humans (e.g., Bar et al., 2006; Kveraga et al.,
2007; Axmacher et al., 2008) are well documented. These findings
suggest that prefrontal regions provide an additional source of
feedback to the visual hierarchy (but note that prefrontal regions
do not seem to be arranged hierarchically with respect to each
other; Yeo et al., 2011). Accordingly, expectation-based prefrontal
modulation of sensory processing has been reported (Bar et al.,
2006; Summerfield et al., 2006; Eger et al., 2007; Kveraga et al.,
2007; Gamond et al., 2011). Predictive mechanisms may thus be
instantiated in a variety of brain regions, but consistently seem to
depend on the use of descending connections to allow the dynamic
comparison of predictions with sensory input.
Converging imaging and computational evidence supports
the proposed role of predictive feedback during perception. If
descending predictions efficiently facilitate the interpretation of
sensory input, then predicted stimuli should evoke less activity
in sensory cortex, consistent with the notion that stimulus-driven
activity conveys an “error term” communicating the remainder of
the signal that has not been explained by top-down predictions.
This effect should be especially pronounced in visual processing
regions that are particularly devoted to the processing of the pre-
dicted stimuli. Accordingly, shapes that appear in an expected
location in the visual field elicit less activity in the retinotopic
region V1 (Alink et al., 2010), and expected face and place stimuli
elicit less activity in face and place-sensitive regions of high-level
visual cortex (Egner et al., 2010).
Moreover, because predictive feedback from higher-level pro-
cessing regions shapes the activity of lower-level sensory regions,
activity in lower-level sensory regions should track surprisingly
sophisticated aspects of the sensory input. A subset of retino-
topic neurons in visual cortex seem sensitive to stimuli outside
of their receptive fields, a property replicated in a computational
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model of visual cortex allowing for predictive feedback to these
cells (Rao and Ballard, 1999). Similarly, activity in low-level retino-
topic visual areas varies with image recognition (Hsieh et al., 2010;
see also Gorlin et al., 2012), conscious experience of figure-ground
segregation (Lamme et al., 1998, 2002), and target detection (Supèr
et al., 2001), implicating top-down modulation by higher-order
areas.
To summarize, expectations derived from learned regularities
are able to guide perception via descending feedback targeting
sensory regions. We next elaborate on these ideas by reviewing
the neural mechanisms for two previously discussed predictive
processes: predictions based on contextual associations and pre-
dictions based on preliminary LSF information extracted from
stimuli. Different neural generators may support these mecha-
nisms, but evidence suggests that both may require interaction
between higher cortical areas and visual cortex to allow top-down
predictions to shape sensory processing.
PREDICTIONS BASED ON CONTEXTUAL ASSOCIATIONS AMONG
OBJECTS
In the previous section, we have suggested that contextual asso-
ciations among objects can create expectancies that guide per-
ception. A distributed network including parahippocampal cortex
(PHC), retrosplenial complex (RSC), and medial prefrontal cor-
tex (mPFC) mediates these contextual associations (Figure 4; Bar
and Aminoff, 2003; Kveraga et al., 2011). To localize this context
network, activity elicited by objects that are strongly associated
with a particular context is compared with that elicited by objects
that are only weakly associated with any particular context. For
example, golf carts are usually found in the context of a golf
course and are thus closely associated with other objects that
share this context such as golf clubs and golf balls, while cam-
eras lack strong associations because they are found in a variety
of contexts and thus do not consistently appear with any par-
ticular set of objects (Bar and Aminoff, 2003; stimuli available
at http://barlab.mgh.harvard.edu/ContextLocalizer.htm). Thus,
associative processing seems to specifically engage these context
network regions. Further support for this claim is provided by the
fact that these regions are recruited in a variety of tasks that call on
contextual associations, such as memory encoding (Peters et al.,
2009), navigation (Rauchs et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2010), and
future thought (Szpunar et al., 2009).
There are several mechanisms by which contextual process-
ing may modulate activity in regions related to visual perception.
PHC itself is situated in the ventral visual stream and lesions
of this region in the monkey severely impair object recognition
(Buckley and Gaffan, 1998; Murray and Mishkin, 1998). Thus,
one possibility is that other context network regions facilitate the
emergence of situation-specific representations in PHC in a top-
down manner (Bar, 2007; Bar et al., 2008). MEG recordings have
shown that strong context objects elicit phase-locking (a measure
of functional interaction) between PHC and other context net-
work regions as early as 170 ms after stimulus onset (Kveraga et al.,
2011), suggesting that the interaction between these regions can
occur early enough to influence perception. Alternatively, context
network regions may also influence processing in lateral occipi-
tal cortex (LOC), a region implicated in object recognition (e.g.,
FIGURE 4 |The context network. A contrast of strong and weak context
object stimuli, revealing the context network on the left hemisphere of an
inflated cortical surface. RSC, retrosplenial complex; PHC, parahippocampal
cortex; MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex. Reprinted from Kveraga et al.
(2011). Copyright ©by National Academy of Sciences/Highwire Press.
Malach et al., 1995; Grill-Spector et al., 2001). Contextual infor-
mation modulates LOC response during recognition (Altmann
et al., 2004; Gronau et al., 2008; MacEvoy and Epstein, 2011), sug-
gesting that this region may be receiving feedback signals from
contextual processing regions. Further research will need to clar-
ify the precise neural mechanism by which contextual predictions
guide processing in sensory cortex.
PREDICTIONS BASED ON LOW SPATIAL FREQUENCY INFORMATION
The prefrontal cortex, specifically orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), may
play a critical role in generating predictions based on LSF infor-
mation (Bar, 2003; Bar et al., 2006). In this proposed framework,
LSF information is extracted from visual input and projected to
OFC via the magnocellular cells of the dorsal visual stream, which
preferentially respond to and rapidly conduct LSF information
(Maunsell et al., 1990; Shapley, 1990; Merigan and Maunsell, 1993;
Bullier and Nowak, 1995; Chen et al., 2007). As we have suggested,
the coarse representations conveyed by LSFs are sufficient to acti-
vate a subset of possible candidates regarding the identity of the
visual input (Bar, 2003). These predictions are then projected
back to object recognition regions in inferior temporal cortex,
facilitating perception (Bar et al., 2006).
Consistent with this proposal, LSF images evoke activity in OFC
prior to inferior temporal areas; thus,LSF information reaches pre-
frontal cortex quickly enough to influence recognition processes
in the ventral visual stream (Bar et al., 2006). Furthermore, LSF
images elicit significant functional coupling between early visual
areas and OFC and between OFC and ventral stream areas (peak-
ing approximately 85 and 135 ms post-stimulus, respectively)
while HSF images do not (Bar et al., 2006). These findings are
consistent with the rapid transmission of LSF information to
OFC, followed by top-down feedback from OFC to the ventral
stream.
Facilitatory feedback originating in OFC has also been shown
using stimuli designed to preferentially stimulate the dorsal mag-
nocellular pathway (Kveraga et al., 2007). Magnocellular cells
are sensitive to small differences in luminance contrast but are
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insensitive to color, whereas the parvocellular cells known to
dominate the ventral stream are sensitive to color but relatively
insensitive to luminance (Livingstone and Hubel, 1988). Accord-
ingly, line drawings of objects in which figure and ground are
identical in color but slightly different in luminance preferentially
stimulate magnocellular cells (i.e., “M-biased” stimuli; Steinman
and Steinman, 1997; Cheng et al., 2004; Kveraga et al., 2007).
Such stimuli can be used to examine whether the magnocellular
pathway is indeed important for conveying information to OFC,
enabling top-down facilitation. Indeed, M-biased stimuli prefer-
entially stimulate OFC and elicit functional interaction between
early visual areas,OFC,and inferior temporal cortex (Kveraga et al.,
2007). Furthermore, the degree of OFC activation elicited by M-
biased stimuli is inversely correlated with reaction time for object
recognition, suggesting that the processing occurring in OFC is
indeed facilitating perception (Kveraga et al., 2007). Intriguingly,
despite this facilitation, M-biased stimuli elicited less activity in
ventral visual regions than stimuli designed to stimulate parvo-
cellular cells, providing indirect evidence that predictive feedback
may reduce the need for exhaustive bottom-up processing during
recognition.
We have suggested that LSF representations in OFC trigger asso-
ciations with object and category information stored in memory,
which then serve as predictions that guide sensory processing. To
activate memory representations, OFC should interact with hip-
pocampal regions in the medial temporal lobe, known to support
long-term memory (for a review, see Squire et al., 2004). Indeed,
OFC and medial temporal regions have been shown to be recip-
rocally connected in non-human primates (Rempel-Clower and
Barbas, 2000). In humans, OFC engages in functional coupling
with the medial temporal lobe during memory retrieval (Nyberg
et al., 1995; Piefke et al., 2003; Tsukiura and Cabeza, 2008; Ander-
son et al., 2010; Colgin, 2011). It will be important to further clarify
the possibility that OFC engages in association-based memory
retrieval during visual perception.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
We have reviewed evidence that predictions have consequences
for conscious perception. When visual input is ambiguous,
predictions may help select the contents of awareness, main-
taining a coherent interpretation of the environment. Under less
demanding conditions, predictions may still influence awareness,
allowing percepts to be generated more quickly and with less inter-
ference by sensory noise. To support these arguments, we have
drawn on observations from a wide variety of domains, includ-
ing the resolution of binocular rivalry, perception of ambiguous
figures, associative learning, and other phenomena. We suggest,
however, that all of these studies index the fact that humans are
highly adept at extracting consistencies in the world and using
this knowledge to generate expectations about the immediate sen-
sory environment. Although different instances of prediction may
recruit different cortical regions, predictive mechanisms are likely
instantiated as dynamic top-down modulation of sensory cortex
by higher sensory and prefrontal areas engaged in comparatively
abstract processing. Via this modulation, predictions about the
environment generated in higher-level cortical regions can guide
perception.
Given that the specific neural processes that give rise to
conscious perception remain unclear, it is difficult to conjec-
ture precisely how predictive feedback influences the contents
of awareness. However, it is intriguing that a number of promi-
nent theories posit that top-down feedback may play an impor-
tant role in generating the neural states postulated to account
for consciousness (Tononi and Edelman, 1998; Lamme, 2010;
Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Meyer, 2012). Indeed, disrupting
top-down processes seems to impair awareness (Pascual-Leone
and Walsh, 2001; Ro et al., 2003; Fahrenfort et al., 2007; Dux
et al., 2010). Perhaps predictions play not only a modulatory
but a driving role in awareness, particularly when other top-
down processes such as attention are not engaged. Future research
should explore whether an individual’s threshold for visual aware-
ness increases when predictive processes are impaired, such as in
depression in which associative processing may be limited (Bar,
2009).
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